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Mental Disability and the Right to Vote
In an era of judicial hostility toward restrictions of the franchise,'
those involving mental disability2 have escaped judicial scrutiny.3 Most
states disqualify mentally ill and retarded individuals from voting.4
Yet the premise of such disfranchisement-that certain citizens lack the
capacity to vote rationally-has gone unquestioned.5
This Note argues that the mental-disability restrictions violate the
equal protection clause.6 An examination of the electoral provisions
and of the constitutional standards that they must satisfy suggests that
efforts to disfranchise irrational persons infringe upon fundamental
rights without furthering a compelling state interest. The Note con-
tends that even if the state objectives were compelling, the existing vot-
ing classifications would be unconstitutional because they are both
overinclusive and underinclusive. The Note acknowledges that states
1. The Supreme Court has struck down many restrictions of the franchise over the
past 15 years. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (invalidating property-rendering
requirement); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating durational-residence
requirement); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (enfranchising federal-enclave
residents); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll-tax
requirement); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (enfranchising servicemen).
2. This Note uses the term "mentally disabled"' as a generic reference to persons
suffering, or legally declared to be suffering, from any mental health problem, whether
due to deficiency or disease, that subjects them to special laws regulating their personal,
social, or civil rights. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAw xv n.l (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971) (similar definition) [hereinafter cited
as S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK].
3. MASSACHUSETrS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT RELATIVE TO VOTING BY
PRISONERS AND THE MENTALLY ILL 56 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MASS. RESEARCH COUNCIL];
see Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1116 (1977) (collecting cases applying restrictions to mentally
disabled). Nonjudicial observers have criticized the disfranchisement mechanisms. See,
e.g., R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, & H. 'VEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY
364-67 (1968) [hereinafter cited as R. ALLEN]; Plotkin, Too 'Crazy' to Vote? Disenfranchise-
ment of the Mentally Handicapped Citizen, MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT SUMMARY OF
ACTIVITIES, Fall 1976, at 1.
4. See pp. 1645-47 infra.
5. That premise has been accepted by writers on the democratic process, see, e.g., H.
GOSNELL, DEMOCRACY-THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM 110 (1948); D. McGOVNEY, THE
AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY 1, 56 (1949), and by mental-health commentators, see, e.g., R.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 366; Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification? 83 YALE L.J.
1237, 1267 (1974).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ...deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.")
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could develop a disfranchisement mechanism aimed at ensuring voter
rationality that would be sufficiently precise. It concludes, however,
that adoption of such a mechanism would be unwise and that states
should not disfranchise any persons on the grounds of mental disability.
I. Statutes and Standards
A. Electoral Disqualification Provisions
Confusion is the common characteristic of state laws that disfranchise
the mentally disabled. A state's definition of the disqualified group
often varies from its constitution to its mental health law to its election
code.7 Some statutory disqualifications conflict with state constitutions.8
Only ten states permit citizens to vote irrespective of mental dis-
ability.9 Twenty-six states proscribe voting by persons labeled idiotic,
7. In some states, the constitution disfranchises idiots, insane persons and the like, but
the statutes disfranchise persons under guardianship or adjudicated incompetent. E.g.,
compare IOWA CONsT. art. 2, § 5 with IOWA CODE ANN. § 48.31(6) (West Supp. 1978) and
WYo. CONST. art. 6, § 6 with WYo. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-102(k) (1977). In Missouri, the
constitution disfranchises persons under guardianship or involuntarily committed, Mo.
CONsT. art. VIII, § 2, but the statute disqualifies only incompetents, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 115.133(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978). After a series of confusing amendments in California,
the state Attorney General declared that, although the constitution required the legisla-
ture to disqualify incompetents, no such statute was in force. See Bolinger, California
Election Law During the Sixties and Seventies, in CAL. ELEc. CODE [55], [93] - [98] (West
1977); cf. id. §§ 707.5-.7 (West Supp. 1979) (new disfranchisement provisions).
8. Connecticut, for example, provides that incompetents may not vote, CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 9-12(a) (1979), but the state constitution establishes only four qualifications for
electors, none of which is related to incompetence, CONN. CONST. art. 6, § 1. In New
York, the constitution permits every citizen meeting age and residence requirements,
except certain criminals, to vote, N.Y. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3, but the election code dis-
qualifies persons adjudicated incompetent or committed, N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 5-106(6)
(McKinney 1978).
9. Eight states do not include mental disability among the electoral disqualifications in
their constitutions or statutes: Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1; CoLo. REv. STAT.
§ 1-2-101 (1973)); Illinois (ILL. CONsT. art. III, § I (but see accompanying commentary:
"Section 1 was not intended to overrule the line of cases holding that insane persons
cannot vote"); Act of Aug. 3, 1977, Pub. Act No. 80-178, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 3-1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978)); Indiana (IND. CONST. art. II, § 2); New Hampshire (N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. 11; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 54:1 (Supp. 1977)); North Carolina (N.C.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 2; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-55 (1976)); Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. VII,
§ I; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2811 (Purdon Supp. 1978)); Tennessee (TENN. CONST. art. IV,
§ I; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-202 (Supp. 1978) (but see id. § 33-306(e) (1977) (may not
disfranchise mental patient unless adjudged incompetent)); Vermont (VT. CONST. ch. II,
§ 42; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2121 (Supp. 1978)). In two other states, the constitutions
authorize disfranchisement of mentally ill or incompetent persons, but the legislatures
have not exercised that authority: Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2; KAN. STAT. § 25-410
(Supp. 1977)); Michigan (MICH. CONsT. art. II, § 2; MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 168.10
(1967)). For a study of Pennsylvania's experience in permitting mentally disabled citizens
to vote, see PENNSYLVANIA ADVISORY Comm., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE LAST
SUFFRAGE FROTrrIER (1978) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N].
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insane, or non compos mentis ("general-disability classifications"). 10
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia disfranchise persons
adjudicated incompetent or placed under guardianship ("guardian-
ship classifications")." Four states disqualify from voting persons com-
mitted to mental institutions ("commitment classifications"),' 2  but
10. States that refer to idiots or insane persons include: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 182); Arkansas (ARK. CONsT. art. 3, § 5); Delaware (DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2);
Georgia (GA. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. I); Idaho (IDAHO CONsT. art. VI, § 3); Iowa (IowA
CONsr. art. 2, § 5); Kentucky (Ky. CONsT. § 145); Mississippi (MISS. CONsT. art. 12, § 241);
Nevada (NEV. CONsT. art. 2, § 1); New Jersey (N.J. CONsT. art. II, para. 6); New Mexico
(N.M. CONsr. art. VII, § I); Ohio (OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6); Texas (TEx. CONS?. art. VI,
§ 1; TEx. ELEc. CODE ANN. art. 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (idiots and lunatics)); Washington
('WAsH. CONsT. art. VI, § 3); Wyoming (*Vyo. CONsT. art. 6, § 6).
States that refer to persons non compos mentis or mentally diseased include: Alaska
(ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2); Arizona (Amiz. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (non compos mentis or
insane)); Hawaii (HAWAII CONsT. art. II, §2); Minnesota (MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 200.02(25)(b) (West Supp. 1978)); Montana (MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2);
Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 2); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. § 127 (non compos mentis
or insane)); Oregon (OR. CONsT. art. II, § 3 (idiot or mentally diseased)); Rhode Island
(R.L CONsT. amend. 38, § 1); West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1); Wisconsin (Wis.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (non compos mentis or insane)).
11. Twenty-one of the jurisdictions have adopted the classifications in their constitu-
tions or election codes: Arizona (Auz. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2); California (CAL. CONST. art.
II, § 4); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-12(a), 17-206b (1979)); District of Columbia
(D.C. CODE § 1-1102(2) (1973)); Florida (FLA. CONSr. art. VI, § 4); Idaho (IDAHO CONST.
art. VI, § 3); Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. § 48.31(6) (West Supp. 1978)); Louisiana (LA. CONST.
art. I, § 10); Maine (ME. CONST. art. II, § 1); Maryland (MD. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 33, § 3-4(d) (1976)); Massachusetts (MAss. CONST. amend, art. III, [§ 105]); Minne-
sota (MINN. CONsT. art. VII, § 1); Missouri (Mo. CONST. art. VIII, § 2); New York (N.Y.
ELEC. LAW § 5-106(6) (McKinney 1978)); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. § 127); South Carolina
(S.C. CONsT. art. II, § 7; S.C. CODE § 7-5-120 (1976)); South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. VII,
§ 2); Utah (UTAH CONsT. art. IV, § 6); Virginia (VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; VA. CODE § 24.1-42
(1973)); Wisconsin (WIs. CONsT. art. III, § 2); Wyoming (WYo. STAT. § 22-1-102(k) (1977)).
Four other states indirectly establish incompetence as a ground for disfranchisement.
The constitutions and election laws of these states do not disqualify incompetents, but
their mental health codes provide that mental patients may not be disfranchised because
of institutionalization unless adjudicated incompetent. Kentucky (compare KY. CONST.
§ 145 with KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.170 (1977)); Nevada (compare NEv. CONsT. art. 2, § I
and NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.540 (1977) with id. § 433AA60(l) (1977)); Oregon (compare OR.
CONST. art. II, § 3 with OR. REV. STAT. § 426.385(1) (1977)); West Virginia (compare W.
VA. CONsT. art. IV, § I and W. VA. CODE § 3-1-3 (Supp. 1978) with id. § 27-5-9(a)). These
mental health code provisions appear to have been adopted as part of the Draft Act
Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, reprinted in S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra
note 2, at 454, 461-62. By their terms, these provisions apply only to institutionalized per-
sons. The states that have adopted the Draft Act may not have meant to amend their
election laws sub silentio. These four states might not, therefore, actually use incom-
petence as a criterion for disfranchisement.
Because guardianship and incompetence are usually adjudicated in the same proceed-
ing, the two classifications are sometimes used indistinguishably. E.g., compare Mo. CONST.
art. VIII, § 2 with Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.133(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
12. Arizona (ARiz. REv. STAT. § 16-150(B) (1975)); Missouri (Mo. CONST. art. VIII, § 2);
New York (N.Y. ELEc. LAw § 5-106(6) (McKinney 1978)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 4-120 (West Supp. 1978)).
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other laws in three of those states provide that commitment alone does
not justify disfranchisement. 13
Although few states use the commitment classifications explicitly,
officials in other states sometimes attempt to draw presumptions of
disqualification from the fact of institutionalization. 14 Some courts have
disfranchised mentally disabled persons without any statutory authoriza-
tion.15
B. Equal Protection Standards for Voting Restrictions
The states unquestionably possess the authority to establish voter
qualifications. 6 The distinctions that states adopt, however, may not
violate the equal protection clause.' 7
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires that classi-
fications that infringe on fundamental rights or interests must with-
stand rigorous judicial scrutiny.'8 The right to vote is a fundamental
13. See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 36-506 (1974); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 33.01 (McKinney
1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 64 (West 1979). The mental health codes containing
those provisions have generally been adopted more recently than the electoral disqualifica-
tions. Whether the legislatures intended to overturn the disqualifications sub silentio is
questionable. See note 11 supra.
14. One presumption is that persons in mental institutions are legally insane, idiotic
or incompetent. Compare Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610,
622-24, 235 N.V.2d 435, 442-43 (1975) (accepting presumption of incompetence) with
Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J. Super. 439, 448-49, 354 A.2d 355, 359-60 (App. Div. 1976) and
Ruffo v. Margolis, 61 A.D.2d 846, 847, 401 N.Y.S.2d 900, 901 (1978) (rejecting presump-
tion). Another presumption is that institutionalized persons are under the guardianship
of the state. Compare Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 619-
20, 235 N.V.2d 435, 440-41 (1975) (accepting presumption) with Boyd v. Board of Registrars
of Voters, 334 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Mass. 1975) (rejecting presumption). But cf. S. BRAKazL 8
R. RocK, supra note 2, at 250-51 (contrasting commitment with determination of incom-
petence).
15. E.g., Welsh v. Shumway, 232 I11. 54, 75, 83 N.E. 549, 558 (1907); In re 223 Absentee
Ballot Appeals, 81 York Legal Rec. 137, 145-46 (C.P. York County, Pa. 1967); cf. INFORMAL
Op. A'rT'y GEN. N.Y., 45 N.Y. State Dep't Rep. 95 (1932) (advising disfranchisement per-
missible despite absence of statutory authorization). But see 1973 Op. ATr'Y GEN. PA. 128
(No. 48) (state may not disfranchise mental patients without constitutional authorization).
16. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 91 (1965).
17. The disfranchisement mechanisms also present due process problems beyond the
scope of this Note. See Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J. Super. 439, 354 A.2d 355 (App. Div.
1976) (discussing due process objections). The mechanisms deprive citizens of the right
to vote without such rudiments of due process as notice and a hearing. Cf. Sweeny v.
Burns, 34 Conn. Supp. 94, 377 A.2d 338, 339-40 (C.P. Fairfield County 1977) (state may not
disfranchise convicted felons without notice and hearing). When disfranchisement is not
automatic, the applicable standards often are extremely vague and grant broad discretion
to local registrars. See R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 365-66; MAss. RESFARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 3, at 14. Moreover, the classifications frequently rely on irrebuttable presumptions,
see pp. 1656-57 infra, which are impermissible in the voting context, see, e.g., Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349-52 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965).
18. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). Statutes that rely
on suspect classifications are also subject to strict scrutiny, but no court has held that
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right.19 Although the Supreme Court has subjected limitations that are
constitutionally authorized2 or that restrict voting in limited-purpose
elections 21 to more lenient standards, most absolute denials of the
franchise must survive strict scrutiny. 22
The essence of strict scrutiny is suspension of judicial deference
toward legislative choices.23 Employing a two-part analysis, the court
first evaluates the importance of the statutory objective and the neces-
sity of the legislative scheme chosen to achieve it.24 Second, the court
mental disability is a suspect classification. See Developments in the Law-Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1229 n.153 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Developments]. But see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 905-10 (1975) (arguing mental illness should be suspect classifica-
tion); Note, supra note 5, at 1258-59 (same).
19. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 561-62 (1964).
It might be contended that the concept of voting as a fundamental right presumes a
capacity for rationality on the individual's part. Because mentally disabled individuals
lack such capacity, the argument would continue, voting is not a fundamental right for
them; therefore, state restrictions involving mental capacity are subject to minimal
scrutiny. The defect with that analysis is two-fold. First, it would enable the state to
evade scrutiny of the precision of its classifications. Even assuming that the interest in
voting is "fundamental" only for rational persons, many rational individuals may be
disfranchised by overinclusive classifications. Such individuals need to protect their in-
terests through the political process at least as much as do nondisabled citizens. See Wald,
The Legal Rights of People with Mental Disabilities in the Community, in 2 LEGAL RIGHTS
OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 1036 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973). These persons,
at least, are entitled to strict scrutiny of the disfranchisement mechanisms. Second, the
argument would have dangerous implications even for irrational persons. It would enable
the state, without being subjected to close scrutiny, to use an individual's lack of capacity
to appreciate or exercise a right as justification for depriving him of it. See Developments,
supra note 18, at 1211 n.65.
20. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (disfranchisement of felons
subject to minimal scrutiny because implicitly authorized by Fourteenth Amendment);
note 72 infra (age restrictions exempt from strict scrutiny because constitutionally
authorized).
21. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,
728 (1973) (water storage district could restrict voting to landowners because of district's
special purpose and disproportionate impact on landowners; no fundamental right in-
volved); cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-11, at 765 (1978) (Salyer narrow
exception to strict scrutiny principle).
22. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 295-98 (1975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336 (1972). Three decisions have appeared to depart from the strict scrutiny prin-
ciple. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 66-70 (1978) (statute subjecting
persons on city's outskirts to "police jurisdiction" without permitting them to vote upheld
under minimal scrutiny); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 757 (1973) (primary
enrollment deadline subjected to minimal scrutiny; requirement "did not absolutely
disfranchise" any voter); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807-08
(1969) (relaxed standards applied to denial of absentee ballots to jail inmates; inmates
failed to prove they could not vote otherwise, Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 300 n.9 (1975)).
23. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969).
24. See pp. 1649-50 infra. Because strict scrutiny requires that restrictions satisfy both
the "fit" and "compelling interest" inquiries, the Court often finds it necessary to reach




examines the fit between the statutory objective and the particular
classification.2 5
Under the first prong of the strict scutiny test, restrictions placed on
voting in nonspecial-interest elections on grounds other than citizen-
ship, residence, or age are invalid unless necessary to achieve a com-
pelling state interest.20 The compelling interest test requires three
inquiries: Is the statutory objective legitimate? Is the interest that the
statute purports to serve sufficiently important in principle and in fact?
Is the particular qualification the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest?27
Of the three inquiries, the second is the most problematic, for the
Supreme Court has not enunciated a test for determining whether an
interest is sufficiently important.28 The Court has often made that
inquiry unnecessary by invoking a relaxed level of scrutiny,2 9 declaring
the objective illegitimate,30 or invalidating the classification on grounds
of fit.3 ' When it has been forced to rule on an interest's importance,
25. See pp. 1650-51 infra.
26. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,
704-06 (1969) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court has sometimes characterized the requisite weight of the state's
interest as "very substantial," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972), or "overriding,"
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970). The Court has acknowledged that, regardless
of which characterization is used, "[t]he key words emphasize a matter of degree: that a
heavy burden of justification is on the State." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
27. The Court has applied some or all of these three components, without clearly
describing its framework for scrutinizing statutory ends. The requirement that the ob-
jective be legitimate applies under a minimal rationality or a strict scrutiny analysis. See,
e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704-06 (1969) (per curiam) (strict scrutiny);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (minimal scrutiny). The second requirement is
that the underlying interest be important both in principle, see p. 1650 infra (suggesting
framework for such analysis), and in fact (i.e., the statute's factual predicate must be
empirically accurate), see, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 298-99 (1975) (rejecting as in-
accurate premise that property owners bear primary burden of bond indebtedness); City of
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1970) (rejecting erroneous legislative as-
sumptions about consequences of nonproperty owners voting on bond issues). The least
drastic means requirement appears to have been adapted from the First Amendment
context; there, as in voting cases, the Court has sought to restrict nonessential abridge-
ments of a fundamental interest. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (relying
on First Amendment precedents). A recent case that applied strict scrutiny to marital
restrictions recognized that all three elements-legitimacy of objective, substantiality of
interest, and unavailability of less restrictive means-must be satisfied in the compelling
interest inquiry. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-90 (1978); cf. Note, Medical Care,
Freedom of Religion, and Mitigation of Damages, 87 YALE L.J. 1466, 1475-78 (1978)
(adopting analysis of compellingness similar to Zablocki).
28. See Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 29 STAN. L. Rlv. 663, 677 (1977).
29. E.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 66-70 (1978); Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728-31 (1973).
30. E.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969) (per curiam); Carring-
ton v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
31. E.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 423-26 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
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the Court has provided little insight into the process by which it
reached the particular conclusion.3 2
One method of assessing the importance of an interest is to examine
the state's treatment of that interest in analogous situations.33 This
approach would leave the ultimate evaluation of an interest's impor-
tance to the legislature, but at least would enable courts to ascertain
whether the purported value was genuine or merely an attorney's post
hoc rationalization.3 4
Once it has found that a statute is necessary to achieve a compelling
interest, the court will examine the fit between the objective and the
particular classification. Strict scrutiny requires that the classification
be carefully tailored, not just reasonably related, to the statutory ob-
jective.35 Courts are extremely intolerant of overinclusive classifica-
tions, because they indicate that the state has needlessly deprived some
persons of a fundamental right.3 6 Courts have voided statutes for under-
inclusivity much less frequently. But underinclusivity signifies that,
although various persons are similarly situated with respect to a legisla-
tive aim, the state has singled out only some to bear a particular
burden.3 7 If the underinclusivity is great enough, it may justify in-
validation of the statutory mechanism.38 Classifications that are over-
32. The Court has often simply stated its conclusion as to an interest's importance.
See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) (requirement of bona fide residence
compelling); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 212 (1970) (risk that property
owners will bear burden of bonds not compelling). Compare Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 96 (1965) (administrative convenience of registrars not compelling) with Marston v.
Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973) (per curiam) (providing adequate time to prepare voting
records compelling).
33. The Court has occasionally engaged in such analysis, but has never articulated the
basis for this approach. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 299-300 (1975) (property-
rendering qualification not compelling because not strict enough to accomplish purported
purpose); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972) (implying promotion of in-
formed voting not compelling because state maintains other provisions "not consistent
with its claimed compelling interest"); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 421 (1970)
(declaration of nonresidence not compelling because state treats federal-enclave inhabitants
as residents for other purposes); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965) (implying
permanent presumption of nonresidence for voting by military personnel not compelling
because state overcomes presumption in other matters and for other transient groups).
34. Cf. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 43-46 (1972) (courts should focus on actual rather than hypothesized objectives in
evaluating statute's constitutionality).
35. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
36. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
37. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring); L. TRIBE, supra note 21, § 16-4.
38. Although the Supreme Court has not invalidated a voting restriction for under-
inclusivity alone, it has occasionally invalidated other classifications on that ground. See,
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inclusive are often underinclusive as well.39
The stringency of the standards that the mental-disability restrictions
must satisfy is justified by the fact that preservation of other civil
rights is largely dependent upon access to the ballot.40
II. Is a Rational Electorate Compelling?
A court reviewing the mental-disability restrictions would first need
to identify their objective and determine whether it was compelling.
A. The Statutory Objective
The state disfranchisement provisions do not contain statements of
purpose. Courts41 and commentators4 2 agree, however, that the statu-
tory objective is to exclude from electoral participation persons in-
capable of making rational voting decisions. 43 Most other objectives
would fail to meet the legitimacy requirement of the compelling state
interest test.44 For example, the Supreme Court would most likely
reject a state's attempts to disfranchise mentally disabled voters because
e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (prohibition of contraceptive distribu-
tion); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (sterilization of
habitual criminals). In several decisions that overturned voting classifications for im-
precision, the Court criticized the classifications' apparent underinclusivity, though the
rulings rested on overinclusivity. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 358-60 (1972);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969); cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 390 (1978) (restriction of marital rights invalid because "grossly underinclusive"
as well as "substantially overinclusive").
Under minimal scrutiny, underinclusivity is rarely fatal to a statutory scheme. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 21, § 16-4; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1084-86 (1969). But strict scrutiny requires a more precise fit between end and
means. As the degree of underinclusivity becomes greater, so does the likelihood that the
real legislative objective is discriminatory or illegitimate. This is especially true with
respect to disfranchisement, because the included group lacks direct political power.
Substantial underinclusivity in a voting classification should therefore be constitutionally
intolerable.
39. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 38, at 1087 nA8.
40. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562 (1964).
41. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884) (dictum); Town of Lafayette
v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 621, 235 N.W.2d 435, 441 (1975).
42. See, e.g., R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 366; Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws, 83 YALE L.J. 580, 586 (1974).
43. This Note takes such incapacity to mean that an individual could not minimally
understand the nature and effect of the electoral process. See note 100 infra (deriving
that meaning). Hereinafter, the term "rational voters" refers to those who can satisfy
this minimal standard. If the state intended a higher threshold of voting competence,
such as, for example, ability to evaluate and differentiate between candidates' positions,
the underinclusivity discussed at pp. 1659-60 infra would be greatly exacerbated, because
many voters might lack the requisite sophistication. See note 114 infra.
44. See note 27 supra (discussing requirement that objective be legitimate).
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of the possibility that they might outvote other local residents, 45 be-
cause they had an insufficient stake in the elections,40 or because dis-
qualification was administratively convenient.47
B. The Harm of Irrationality
In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, the restriction must be necessary to
achieve a compelling interest. States have never been required to ex-
plain what interests would be endangered if citizens incapable of ra-
tionality were permitted to vote.4s Like the commentators, the states
have simply assumed the importance of rationality.4 9 Although the
Supreme Court has held that promotion of informed and intelligent
voting is a legitimate aim,50 it has not said whether it is compelling.
No court has ruled on whether exclusion of irrational voters furthers a
compelling interest.51
A state forced to justify the disqualification provisions might first
insist that they represent a fundamental and longstanding feature of
the political system. The government is concerned only that its citizens
be capable of voting rationally; whether they vote wisely or foolishly is
their own business. 52
It is questionable whether the rationality requirement is indeed so
basic. By exempting only age, residence, and citizenship qualifications
from strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has implied that only those
45. See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969) (per curiam) (may not
disfranchise nonproperty taxpayers because of their attitude toward expansion of utilities);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (may not disfranchise soldiers because they
might outvote civilians).
46. The Supreme Court has never decided whether a group could in theory be excluded
from general-purpose elections because it had an insufficient stake in the outcome, con-
sistently avoiding that argument by finding that excluded citizens are in fact substantially
affected by the electoral decisions. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422-26 (1970);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 & n.5 (1969) (per curiam).
47. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349-52 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 96 (1965).
48. See MASS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 56 (cases involving mental-disability
disfranchisement have not reached validity of purpose).
49. See note 5 supra.
50. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36
(1973) (dictum); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 (1966).
51. The only restriction directed to the quality of a voter's decisionmaking process
upheld by the Court is the literacy test. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elec-
tions, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Because the Court applied only minimal scrutiny in evaluating
the equal protection challenge, see id. at 51, the Court's subsequent application of strict
scrutiny to voting restrictions has undermined Lassiter's authority. See L. TIBE, supra
note 21, § 13-15, at 770 (Lassiter could not survive strict scrutiny).
52. Indeed, the state could not constitutionally concern itself with the wisdom of
a voter's choice. See note 100 infra.
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requirements are basic to the political system. 53 The fact that ten states
do not require rational capacity as a prerequisite to votina 4 also casts
doubt on its fundamental character. More important, the state's argu-
ment fails to explain why such a tradition of exclusion is compelling;
the Court5 and Congresso have overridden other voter qualifications
that were longstanding. The state could not avoid the compelling in-
terest test by appealing to tradition.5 7
The state might alternatively argue that two interests underlie the
quest for rationality: promotion of effective government and preven-
tion of manipulation. With respect to the former interest, the state
could contend that, as a group, voters capable of rationality make
"better" decisions than do voters incapable of rationality, thereby
selecting better officials. Better officials, the argument would continue,
result in more effective government, and this difference in result is
sufficient to justify exclusion of persons who cannot vote rationally.5
The interest in promoting effective government if certainly legiti-
mate, but it is not sufficiently important in principle or in fact to
satisfy the compelling interest test. If the state took seriously the re-
lationship between individual votes and effective government, it would
be concerned about other components of the voting decision, such as
the availability of meaningful campaign information and the ability
of voters to use it. Rational capacity alone may not lead to selection of
effective officials if voters base their choices on inadequate informa-
tion."0 Yet states do not require that voters be capable of informed
53. See note 26 suPra (citing cases). Arguably, the Court has not mentioned rationality
in this context because it has never been presented with a challenge to that requirement.
54. See note 9 supra (citing statutes).
55. See note I suPra (citing cases); Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60,
87-88 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (practice that violates equal protection not justified
by fact "great many States" authorize it or that it is "of venerable age").
56. See note 60 infra (citing statute).
57. The state might offer a nonconsequentialist justification for the restrictions. It
could argue that permitting irrational persons to vote is inconsistent with the notion that
democracy requires participants able to reason and exercise free will; thus, irrational
persons should be prevented from voting even if such voting would not tangibly harm
society or the government. This purist approach is unpersuasive because the equal pro-
tection clause itself embodies a nonconsequentialist position: citizens should be permitted
to vote unless the state can justify preventing them from voting. To oppose this tenet,
one must posit a consequentialist result that justifies overriding the constitutionally
embodied value.
58. Cf. Simson, suPra note 28, at 684 (similar argument with respect to importance of
informed electorate).
59. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973)
(dictum) ("The electoral process . . . depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot
cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes have been
adequately developed."); Simson, supra note 28, at 684 (effectiveness of state government
"depends in large measure on the extent to which the people cast knowledgeable votes").
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voting, nor have they undertaken concerted efforts to ensure that
voters base their choices on reasoned analysis. 0 States voice little con-
cern over the quality of a voter's choice and its relationship to effective
government-except with respect to mentally disabled persons.
The empirical assumption of the impact-on-government rationale-
that voters incapable of rationality make "worse" decisions-is also
questionable. Many citizens vote "irrationally," basing their decisions
on factors other than investigation and reasoned analysis.01 The impact
on government is the same whether the voter cannot choose rationally
or can, but simply does not. Studies have found that mental patients'
voting patterns are similar to those of "normal" voters and have con-
cluded that permitting all mental patients to vote would have no
significant effect on the outcome of elections. 2 Thus, neither in prin-
ciple nor in fact is the impact-on-government rationale compelling.
A second state argument could rest on the supposed susceptibility
of the mentally disabled to manipulation. A candidate's agent or a staff
member at a mental institution could, the argument would run, as-
semble a group of patients, tell them for whom to vote and then drive
them to the polls. An unscrupulous individual could thereby control
elections wherever mentally disabled persons constituted a significant
portion of the electorate. 63
Prevention of voter manipulation unquestionably satisfies the first
two compelling interest inquiries: it is legitimate and sufficiently im-
portant. The state consistently pursues that interest through the secret
60. Congress appears to believe that the impact-on-government rationale is not com-
pelling, for it has proscribed disfranchisement of illiterate, uneducated and non-English
speaking persons, even though they may be less capable than other voters of acquiring the
information necessary for a "good" choice. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1976) (proscribing
literacy and education requirements); id. § 1973aa-la (facilitating voting by non-English
speaking citizens); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 357 n.29 (1972) (by prohibiting de-
vices that would assure voter knowledgeability, Congress declared "people should be al-
lowed to vote even if they were not well informed"); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
654 (1966) (Congress may have concluded need to promote intelligent voting failed to
justify English-literacy requirement).
61. See, e.g., A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER, & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER
253-54 (1960) ("striking proportion" of voters focus on "the 'nice way' the candidate speaks
or looks"); Wald, Basic Personal and Civil Rights, in President's Comm. on Mental Re-
tardation, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 25 (M. Kindred, J. Cohen, D.
Penrod, & T. Shaffer eds. 1976) (much voting highly irrational even among persons of
normal capacity).
62. See Klein & Grossman, Voting Competence and Mental Illness, 3 PROC. 76TH ANN.
CONVENTION AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N 701, 702 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Klein & Gross-
man, Voting Competence]; Klein & Grossman, Voting Pattern of Mental Patients in a
Community State Hospital, 3 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 149, 152 (Summer 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Klein & Grossman, Voting Pattern]; Wellner & Gaines, Patients'
Right to Vote, 21 HOSPITAL 9- COMMUNITY PSYCH. 163, 164 (1970).
63. A study of community opposition to voting by mental patients in Pennsylvania
found that such fears were widespread. See CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 9, at 5, 21.
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ballot and antibribery and anticoercion laws. But disqualification of
irrational voters fails to satisfy the third inquiry: it is not necessary to
further the interest in preventing manipulation. Courts consistently
have held that, although prevention of voter fraud and manipulation
is important, it does not justify blanket disfranchisement. 4
The state's assumption that irrational voters are peculiarly subject
to manipulation is based on a stereotypical view of mentally disabled
persons. Even if that stereotype were accurate, however, there would
be less drastic means of preventing the manipulation.0 5 The fear of
manipulation relates primarily to irrational voters confined to institu-
tions 0 and could not justify disfranchisement of irrational voters
residing in the community. Yet only four states focus on presence in
an institution as the criterion for disfranchisement. 7 Furthermore, the
state could institute a variety of measures to minimize the danger that
mental patients would be manipulated. It could provide freer access to
institutionalized voters for all candidates, thereby reducing the op-
portunity for one-sided influence. It could discourage institutional
staff from telling patients how to vote. 8 It might even encourage pa-
tients to vote in the community in which they resided prior to institu-
tionalization.9 In addition to controls aimed at the voter, the state
could adopt stringent penalties for coercion.70
64. The Supreme Court has held that soldiers cannot be disfranchised because of the
danger that their commander will influence their voting. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 93-94 (1965). Judges have noted in other contexts that fear of manipulation cannot
justify limiting a voter's rights. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 534 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (jail inmates).
65. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345-54 (1972) (prevention of vote fraud com-
pelling, but durational residence requirement not necessary to achieve goal).
66. This would be true for three reasons. First, a party intent on manipulation would
not know which voters in the community were incapable of rationality. Second, an irra-
tional person in the community would have greater exposure to various candidates than
would a confined person. Third, the costs of manipulating scattered voters might well be
prohibitive.
67. See note 12 sup~ra (citing statutes).
68. Such restrictions might infringe upon the staff's First Amendment rights, but if
carefully drafted could be analogized to bans on political involvement by state em-
ployees. Cf. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 564-67 (1973) (government may restrict employees' political involvement).
69. See CIVIL RICHTS COMM'N, supra note 9, at 27-29 (discussing similar recommenda-
tions). Such dispersed voting would reduce the incentive for manipulation by minimizing
the impact of the patients' votes on any one local contest.
Although some election officials have refused to recognize mental patients as local
residents, courts generally have overturned such refusals. See, e.g., Coulombre v. Board
of Registrars of Voters, 326 N.E.2d 360, 362-63 (Mass. App. 1975); Iafrate v. Suffolk
County Bd. of Elections, 54 A.D.2d 769, 387 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 991, 368
N.E.2d 35, 398 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1977). But see In re 223 Absentee Ballot Appeals, 81 York
Legal Rec. 137, 145-46 (C.P. York County, Pa. 1967) (patient in asylum fails to meet
residence requirement).
70. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 534 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(punishing coercion less drastic alternative than disfranchisement); Dunn v. Blumstein,
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Ensuring that only rational persons vote may be a reasonable goal,
but the manner in which the states regulate the voting process casts
doubt upon the depth of their concern. Moreover, the fact that the
disfranchisement procedures are severely underinclusive 7' suggests that
the states' objective is not of utmost importance-if it were, the states
would have adopted procedures better suited to detecting irrational
voters. Under the first stage of strict scrutiny analysis, therefore, legisla-
tive attempts to disqualify irrational voters are invalid because they are
unnecessary to attain a compelling state interest.72
III. Precision of the Disfranchisement Classifications
Even if promotion of rational voting were a compelling interest, the
second stage of equal protection analysis would require that the dis-
franchisement mechanisms be carefully tailored to satisfy that objective
in order to survive strict scrutiny.73 Because the existing classifications
presume that irrationality is a necessary and exclusive concomitant of
mental disability, they are both overinclusive and underinclusive.
A. The Existing Mechanisms
1. Overinclusivity
The general-disability, guardianship, and commitment classifications
all rest on the assumption that a person suffering from any mental
405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972) (durational residence requirement not least restrictive means of
preventing fraud because state has "variety of criminal laws that are more than adequate
to detect and deter ... fraud").
71. See pp. 1659-60 infra.
72. The conclusion that promotion of rational voting is not compelling need not
invalidate electoral age qualifications. Courts have assumed that age requirements must
pass only minimal scrutiny. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975) (dictum);
Gaunt v. Brown, 341 F. Supp. 1187, 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 809 (1972).
Adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment arguably provided a basis for that assumption:
by forbidding exclusion only of persons eighteen or older, the Amendment implicitly
approved disfranchisement of minors and therefore insulated it from strict scrutiny. Cf.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (disfranchisement of felons subject to
minimal scrutiny because implicitly authorized by § 2 of Fourteenth Amendment). Absent
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment authorization (or if the Amendment were interpreted as
barring disqualification of the older group absolutely while leaving intact the require-
ment that disqualification of minors must pass strict scrutiny), the age qualifications
might be difficult to distinguish from the mental-disability restrictions. Cf. L. TRIBE,
sulira note 21, § 16-29 (suggesting age-based presumptions should be rebuttable).
73. See p. 1650 supra. Quantification of over- or underinclusivity is impossible, and
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is not a fixed point at which imprecision
becomes intolerable. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). Accordingly, the




disability is incapacitated for all purposes, including voting.7 4 That
presumption of blanket incapacity has been widely rejected. Medical
and legal commentators, as well as some judges, have emphasized that
an individual incapable of making particular types of decisions may be
fully capable of making others.7 5 In many areas of the law, courts will
not single out a mentally disabled person for distinct treatment unless
his disability is shown to affect the capacity in question.76 One
psychiatric study has concluded that mental patients may be com-
petent to vote despite their illness.77
The substantive issues involved in the proceedings that trigger dis-
franchisement are rarely related to capacity for rational voting.78
74. See B. SWADRON & D. SULLIVAN, THE LAW AND MENTAL DISORDER 79 (1973) (report
of Canadian Mental Health Ass'n); Klein & Grossman, Voting Competence, supra note
62, at 702.
75. See, e.g., Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 259 Cal. App. 2d 562, 572-73, 66 Cal. Rptr. 659,
665 (1968); State ex. rel. Standefer v. England, 328 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Mo. App. 1959); R.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 74, 224; INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE OF SOCIETIES FOR THE MENTALLY
HANDICAPPED, SYMPOSIUM ON GUARDIANSHIP OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 16 (1969) [herein-
after cited as SYMPOSIUMs ON GUARDIANSHIP]; Mental Disability Legal Resource Center,
ABA Comm'n on the Mentally Disabled, Limited Guardianships for the Mentally
Disabled, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 231 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Limited Guardianships];
Roth, Meisel, & Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCH.
279 (1977); Developments, supra note 18, at 1214 & n.80.
76. See In re Zanetti, 34 Cal. 2d 136, 141, 208 P.2d 657, 659-60 (1949) (meaning of in-
sanity varies with capacity involved); Mezer & Rheingold, Mental Capacity and Incom-
Petency: A Psycho-Legal Problem, 118 Am. J. PSYCH. 827, 827-29 (1962) (identifying tests
of competence for 31 legal matters); Developments, supra note 18, at 1214 & n.81; cf.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 242-44 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (fact that
18-year-olds are legally competent for many purposes suggests they are competent to
vote).
The state frequently permits mentally ill individuals to make their own decisions in
such important matters as voluntary admission to a mental institution, see, e.g., Aiuz.
REV. STAT. § 36-518 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-46 (West Supp. 1978), and refusal of
medical treatment, see, e.g., In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D.&C.2d 619, 623 (C.P. Northampton
County, Pa. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-502.6 (1979). An adjudication of insanity or in-
competence is not dispositive with respect to: competence to stand trial, see, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.04 (1962); Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. PiTr.
L. REV. 593, 595 (1960); criminal responsibility, see, e.g., People v. Field, 108 Cal. App. 2d
496, 500, 238 P.2d 1052, 1055 (1952); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962); tort liability, see,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283(B) (1965); Curran, Tort Liability of the
Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52 (1960); testamentary capacity,
see, e.g., In re Estate of Nelson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 42, 52-53, 38 Cal. Rptr. 459, 465 (1964);
Weihofen & Usdin, Who is Competent to Make a Will? 54 MENTAL HYGIENE 37, 39
(1970); or contractual capacity, see, e.g., Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the
Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271, 275-76 (1944); Note, Mental Illness and the
Law of Contracts, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1020, 1026-32 (1959).
77. See Klein & Grossman, Voting Competence, supra note 62, at 702.
78. B. SWADRON & D. SULLIVAN, supra note 74, at 79; see Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 259
Cal. App. 2d 562, 572, 66 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664 (1968) (purpose of commitment proceeding not
to determine whether "person is incapable of ... understanding the nature or effects of
his acts"); 59 OP. ATr'Y GEN. CAL. 263, 266 (1976) (purpose of guardianship proceeding
"is to protect the incompetent's estate, not to take away his voting right").
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Guardianship proceedings focus on whether an individual is incapable
of managing his financial affairs. 70 Commitment proceedings focus on
whether an individual is dangerous or in need of treatment.80 Most
states, in fact, now require more than mere institutionalization to
establish a presumption of incompetence to vote.8' A person in need
of guardianship 2 or institutionalization8 3 may be competent for many
purposes.
The disfranchisement mechanisms also ignore the fact that a person's
capacity may vary over time. 4 An individual once committed as men-
79. See, e.g., In re Estate of Langford, 50 Ill. App. 3d 623, 627, 364 N.E.2d 735, 737
(1977); In re Guardianship of Cornia, 546 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1976).
80. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975); Halderman v. Penn-
hurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1315 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
81. The states are: Arizona (ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-506 (1974)); California (CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §§ 5005, 5331 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978)); Colorado (CoLo. REV. STAT. § 27-10-
119 (Supp. 1978)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-206b, 19-575a(a) (1979)); District
of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 21-564 (1973)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394A59(7) (West Supp.
1979)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 88-502.9 (1979)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 914 § 2-
101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-18 (Burns Supp. 1978));
Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. §§ 229.23, .27 (West Supp. 1978)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. § 59-2930
(1976)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. § 202A.170 (1977)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28:171(A) (West Supp. 1978)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34, §§ 2143(5), 2254(3) (1978));
Maryland (MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 51; art. 59A, § 35 (Supp. 1978)); Massachusetts (MAss.
ANN. LAWs ch. 123, § 25 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 330.1702 (1975)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 252A.12, 253A.18(1) (West 1971 S- Supp.
1978)); Mississippi (MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-101 (Supp. 1978)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 202.175 (Vernon Supp. 1979)); Montana (MONT. REV. COnES ANN. § 38-1313 (Supp. 1977));
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1066 (1976)); Nevada (NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 433.003, 433A.460
(1), 435.340 (1977)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:42 (Supp. 1977)); New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2 (West Supp. 1978)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-1-5 (1978)); New York (N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 33.01 (McKinney 1978)); North
Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-55.2(c) (Supp. 1977)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-
03.1-33 (1978)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.30.1 (Page Supp. 1979)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 64 (West 1979)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.295, .385(1),
427.305 (1977)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. Laws § 40.1-5-5(6) (1977)); South Carolina (S.C.
CODE § 44-23-1070 (1976)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-306(e) (1977)); Texas (TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-83(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-
48(1) (1978)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7706 (Supp. 1978)); Virginia (VA. CODE
§§ 37.1-84.1, -87 (1976)); Washington (VAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05A50 (1975)); West
Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9(a) (Supp. 1978)); and Wyoming (WYo. STAT. § 25-3-124(d)
(1977)). But see note 14 supra (some officials nevertheless presume incompetence from
institutionalization).
82. See SYMposiumt ON GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 75, at 15 (because blanket presump-
tion of incompetence invalid, disfranchisement "should not be an automatic consequence
of the appointment of a guardian"); Plotkin, supra note 3, at 11 (need for guardian un-
related to voting capacity).
83. See, e.g., Boyd v. Board of Registrars of Voters, 334 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Mass. 1975)
(commitment cannot be equated with general incompetence); Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J.
Super. 439, 448-49, 354 A.2d 355, 359 (App. Div. 1976) (same); H. DAVIDSON, FORENsIC
PSYCHIATRY 196 (1952) (no necessary relationship between commitability and competence);
Crawfis, Discharge from State Hospital in Relation to Competency, 113 AM. J. PSYCH.
448, 448 (1956) (estimating 75% of mental patients are competent).
84. See Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 222
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tally ill may remain disfranchised even after recovery. 5 Psychiatrists
who have studied mental patients' voting habits confirm that any
general disfranchisement will be overinclusive: "[A]n unselected patient
population hospitalized for mental illness is able to comprehend the
task of voting and fulfill requirements of the task just as the general
population does."8' 6
2. Underinclusivity and Arbitrariness
The disfranchisement mechanisms are underinclusive because they
do not focus on the critical factor: capacity for rationality. The clas-
sifications encompass only those individuals who may be incapable of
voting rationally and who satisfy the particular criteria of the disfran-
chisement mechanisms. Some persons incapable of voting rationally
will not fit into any of the statutory categories. The general-disability
classifications may reach only persons declared insane in the course of
criminal proceedings.8 7 The guardianship classifications cannot encom-
pass all irrational persons.88 Mentally disabled individuals seldom will
be subjected to competence inquiries if they have few assets, can
manage their financial affairs, or receive informal family supervision.89
The commitment classifications do not reach irrational persons who
(1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (testimony of Arthur E. Cohen) (although psy-
chiatrists recognize that competence varies over time, periodic reviews of mental patient's
condition overlook the variations); Ellis, Should Some People be Labeled Mentally Ill?
31 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 435, 445 (1967) (mental dysfunction commonly fluctuates).
85. See Crawfis, supra note 83, at 449-50 (because hospitals are conservative in certifying
restoration of competence, presumption of incapacity often continues until contrary ju-
dicial determination). Some authorities hold that the continuing presumption of incom-
petence, see, e.g., Spaulding v. Miller, 221 Or. 503, 509-10, 350 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1960),
requires disfranchisement of discharged patients until they convince a court that they are
competent to vote, see, e.g., 1959 Op. Air'Y GEN. N.Y. 28; 1950-52 Op. ATT'Y GEN. OR.
208 (No. 1800) (1951).
86. Klein & Grossman, Voting Competence, supra note 62, at 702; see note 62 supra
(citing similar studies).
87. See 59 Op. ATr'y GEN. CAL. 263, 265 (1976) ("legal determination as to competency
to vote ... limited to those persons who have been found 'insane' as a result of criminal
proceedings"). The states generally have no proceedings other than criminal trials in
which a person can be labeled insane, because that label has become obsolete. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 4-61 (Supp. 1978) (repealing reference to findings of lunacy inquisi-
tion); Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 WASH. L. REv. 735, 737-39 (1973)
("insanity" obsolete).
88. See, e.g., Fazio v. Fazio, 378 N.E.2d 951, 955 (Mass. 1978) (finding of mental illness
not sufficient for appointment of guardian); New v. Corrough, 370 S.W.2d 323, 327 (Mo.
1963) (refusing to disqualify person declared insane and committed, because not under
guardianship).
89. See, e.g., MAss. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 15, 58 (guardianship usually
stems from proceeding "unrelated" to voting competence, such as disposition of estate);
R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 330 (1973) (competence seldom challenged unless family
desires protection of assets).
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enter institutions voluntarily"0 or who, for various reasons, are not
subject to commitment.91
In short, the disqualification classifications are underinclusive be-
cause a person's lack of rational capacity-the basis of the state's con-
cern-is not sufficient to trigger them. The Attorney General of
California has concluded that the number of persons who fall within
that state's disfranchisement provision is "infinitesimal when related
... to all the possible number of voters who may be mentally incom-
petent for voting purposes." 92
The manner in which the disfranchisement mechanisms operate,
moreover, makes arbitrary application inevitable. A state generally will
ignore mentally disabled persons who avoid drawing attention to their
disabilities.93 Even if the mentally disabled are correctly identified,
only a handful of states94 provide for notifying election officials that
an individual has been disqualified from voting. Because most states
have no procedure for enforcing the statutes, disfranchisement is often
fortuitous.9 5 Such arbitrary discrimination in determining who may not
vote is constitutionally impermissible.9 6
B. Specific Adjudications of Voting Competence
Although the imprecision of the disfranchisement provisions could
be reduced by altering the method of identifying unqualified voters,
such an approach would be unwise.
90. See Klein 9. Grossman, Voting Competence, supra note 62, at 702 ("many patients
are disenfranchised by chance, depending on whether they are committed by court or
admitted on a voluntary basis").
91. See H. DAVIDSON, supra note 83, at 196 (person could be incompetent but not
require hospitalization).
92. 59 Op. Arr'v GEN. CAL. 263, 265-66 (1976).
93. See, e.g., Armstrong, The Mentally Disabled and the Right to Vote, 27 HOSPITAL
& COMMUNITY PSYCH. 577, 581 (1976) (voting rights of many retarded and disturbed
persons never questioned because not formally labeled mentally disabled); Mechanic,
Some Factors in Identifying and Defining Mental Illness, in MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOCIAL
PRoCESEs 26-30 (T. Scheff ed. 1967) (designation of mental illness depends on visibility
of symptoms).
94. E.g., California (CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 707.5-.7 (West Supp. 1979)); New York (N.Y.
ELEC. LAW § 5-708(4) (McKinney 1978)).
95. See MAss. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 14; Wald, supra note 61, at 25
(laws disfranchising incompetents have few enforcement mechanisms). Registrars in some
states have no authority to inquire into a voter's competence, despite the existence of
disfranchisement statutes. See, e.g., Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J. Super. 433, 448, 354 A.2d
355, 359 (App. Div. 1976), 59 Op. ATT'Y GEN. CAL. 263, 265 (1976).
96. See O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974) (statute that discriminates between
categories of voters in "wholly arbitrary" manner violates equal protection); Louisiana v.
United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965) (understanding requirement void because arbi-
trarily applied).
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1. The Model
Critics have urged that blanket determinations of an individual's
mental incapacity be replaced by adjudications of specific com-
petence.07 To disfranchise an individual, the court would have to find
that he was incompetent to vote, not merely that he was generally
incompetent.98 A few states already require specific competence ad-
judications before mental patients can be deprived of any rights.99
Assuming that the underlying interest is compelling, specific com-
petence adjudications could in theory avoid the constitutional in-
firmities of the existing disfranchisement mechanisms. The test of
competence would be whether the individual could understand the
nature and effect of the electoral process. 100 Presumably, an individual
97. See, e.g., R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 252; SYMPOSIUM ON GUARDIANSHIP, supra note
75, at 15; Limited Guardianships, supra note 75, at 231; cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-1.6(5)
(Supp. 1977) (incompetent individual should be permitted to exercise "those rights that
are within his comprehension and judgment").
98. See Wexler & Scoville, Special Project: The Administration of Psychiatric Justice:
Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARiz. L. REv. 1, 95 (1971). See generally Limited
Guardianships, supra note 75, at 231 (describing general operation of specific competence
proceedings).
99. The states are: Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-206b (1977)); Iowa (IowA CODE
ANN. § 229.27 (West Supp. 1978)); Nevada (Nav. REv. STAT. §§ 433.003, 433AA60(1) (1977));
Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 6.03(1), 880.33(3) (West Supp. 1978)). All the provisions but
Wisconsin's are contained in declarations of the rights of persons committed to mental
institutions, not in chapters on voting or guardianship. General findings of incompetence,
therefore, may still be sufficient to justify disfranchisement of persons who have not been
institutionalized. The frequency of adjudications of voting incompetence, and the manner
in which they operate, are unclear, because no such adjudications have been reported. In
many matters, however, the law has long focused on specific incompetence. See note 76
supra.
100. Of the states that provide for specific competence determinations, only Iowa
specifies a test of competence. See IowA CODE ANN. § 229.27 (West Supp. 1978) ("whether
the person possesses sufficient mind to understand in a reasonable manner the nature
and effect of the act"). Courts have focused, similarly, on whether particular voters "are
mentally incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and objective of the elective
question .. " Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 621, 235
N.W.2d 435, 441 (1975); accord, Welsh v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 75, 83 N.E. 549, 558
(1907); In re 223 Absentee Ballot Appeals, 81 York Legal Rec. 137, 147 (C.P. York
County, Pa. 1967); cf. R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 222-23 (discussing competence form with
similar criteria of voting ability).
Three alternative standards of voting competence are less appropriate than the "under-
standing" test. The state might use a "reasonable person" standard, i.e., whether the
voting choice of the individual in question would be one that a reasonable person might
make. But the Supreme Court has forbidden such inquiry into the content of a particular
voting decision. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969) (per
curiam) (exclusion for fear of how person will vote impermissible); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (same). Focusing on content creates a danger that the decisionmaker's
preferences will color his views of competence. Few elections, moreover, present choices that
a reasonable person could not select.
A second standard would look to the reasons a suspect voter offered for his choices. But
the trier of fact might impose his own substantive beliefs in evaluating the voter's
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could request reexamination whenever he sought to vote.' 0 ' By disfran-
chising only those persons found incapable of such basic understanding,
the mechanisms would not be overinclusive. 0 2
The state could minimize underinclusivity by expanding the groups
subject to competence inquiries to include persons whose personal
histories indicated a substantial likelihood that they could not vote
rationally. The state might, for example, test any individual who had
received treatment in a public or private mental health facility, been
placed under guardianship, or been enrolled in a special education
program. The fit would not be perfect: some persons incapable of
voting rationally may not suffer from any mental disability that would
subject them to the competence test. But if the state added enough
triggering devices, it would reach substantially more incompetent
voters than the existing mechanisms reach and could reduce under-
inclusivity to constitutionally tolerable levels.' 03
2. The Defects
Though in theory a system of specific competence adjudications
could be developed that would not be voidable on grounds of fit,'
1 4
four considerations militate against adoption of such a system. First,
the test of competence, even if straightforward in form, would be dif-
ficult to apply. The issue of whether a person understood the voting
process could almost never be answered objectively. The reviewer
would have great discretion in determining what it meant to under-
stand the process and whether the individual's degree of understand-
ing was sufficient. The perception of rationality would often hinge on
the quality of a voter's explanations of his choices. The proceeding
would enable the reviewer to impose his own manner of thinking and
reasons. A choice might be rational, moreover, even though the voter could not articulate
the basis for it.
A minimal standard of competence would require that the voter be capable of
evidencing some choice. That standard is probably lower than the states that adopted
the disfranchisement provisions intended. It would render the provisions pointless, since
virtually every person who desired to vote could designate some preference.
101. A provision for periodic reexamination would be necessary to avoid overin-
clusivity because a person's competence can vary over time. See pp. 1658-59 supra.
102. Such adjudications would also avoid many of the due process deficiencies of the
existing mechanisms. See note 17 supra.
103. A particular system of competence adjudications might still be underinclusive,
because states might be unwilling to extend the mechanisms far enough. The point is
simply that a state could develop classifications of persons subject to the tests, short of
universal application, without violating equal protection, given that a minimal degree of
underinclusivity is constitutionally tolerable. See note 38 supra.
104. Even carefully tailored adjudications, however, would be invalid because un-
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See pp. 1652-56 supra.
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value preferences on the determination of competence. 10 5
Second, the requirement of specificity might in practice often be
ignored. In the few cases that have adjudicated individual voting
capabilities, the determinations rested on appearances of incapacity
rather than on serious psychological investigations. 00 The tendency
of courts to presume blanket incompetence from mental disability
might continue; a judge confronted with an incoherent person labeled
psychotic or retarded and confined to an institution might simply
check off voting, along with other activities, as inappropriate. It is
unrealistic to assume that judges can or will investigate carefully each
of an individual's separate capacities. 107 They may instead effectively
delegate to mental health professionals the power to grant or withhold
the franchise. These practical problems of implementation, along with
the inherent subjectivity of the inquiry, could render disfranchisement
through specific competence hearings as arbitrary as it is under the
existing systems.
Third, the Voting Rights Acti0s might bar a state from subjecting
only certain individuals to a competence test. Congress has prohibited
states from determining a person's voting qualifications pursuant to
any standard, practice, or procedure different from that applied to
other individuals. 0 Arguably, federal law would require the state to
subject all voters, not merely those with a history of mental disability,
to the competence inquiries." 0
The Voting Rights Act might, in addition, bar any competence test-
105. Cf. Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institu-
tions and Prisons, 17 ARz. L. REV. 59, 78 (1975) (similar danger in reviewing competence
to refuse medical care).
106. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Thorn, 145 Ark. 466, 468-71, 224 S.W. 962, 962-63 (1920)
(weighing testimony that voter "had a peculiar shaped head and face" against testimony
that "[w]itness had seen him buy cigars, candy, and other little things"); Town of
Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 622-23, 235 N.W.2d 435, 442 (1975)
("[This Court cannot make sufficient distinctions . . . to determine which ones if any
were capable intelligence-wise to be an elector .... ) (quoting trial court); Comment,
"Civil Insanity": The New York Treatment of the Issue of Mental Incapacity in Non-
Criminal Cases, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 76, 89-93 (1958) (courts focus on lay opinions of apparent
rationality in competence adjudications).
107. Cf. Hearings, supra note 84, at 453 (exhibit of Arthur E. Cohen) (District of
Columbia officials continue making blanket assessments of incompetence based on
financial incapacity, though law divides competence into six specific areas).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973aa-5 (1976).
109. Id. § 1971(a)(2). The proscription is not limited to discrimination based on race.
See Frazier v. Callicutt, 383 F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
110. No systematic inquiry into voting competence now occurs. See B. SWADRON & D.
SULLIVAN, supra note 74, at 81-82. Although informal scrutiny may occur when individuals
attempt to vote, see, e.g., 1973 REP. ATr'Y GEN. N.M. 84, 90 (No. 73-44), some decisions have
stated that election officials have no authority to examine a voter's competence, see note
95 supra.
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ing, whether applied to all voters or only to some. The Act prohibits
states from disfranchising persons for failure to "demonstrate the
ability to ...understand, or interpret any matter.""' Competence
tests fall within the language of this proscription, and application of
the ban to mental-disability tests is appropriate even if unforeseen by
the drafters. Congress outlawed understanding tests because they
granted local officials broad discretion to determine whether an in-
dividual was fit to vote; that discretion was often used to discriminate
against particular groups.112 In administering understanding tests as
part of competence adjudications, officials might be more harsh in
judging persons whose appearance was abnormal, who acted strangely,
or who were labeled mentally ill or retarded.1 3
Finally, adoption of a broad system of competence adjudications
would erect a substantial barrier between citizens and the ballot box,
especially as the state's criteria for subjecting persons to the tests be-
came more inclusive. Many persons, whether mentally disabled or not,
might be unable to pass the understanding test.1 4 Others might simply
be unwilling to try. Much of the suffrage expansion of recent decades
would be undone as citizens were once again forced to prove that they
were intellectually qualified to vote.
Conclusion
States have adopted mental-disability restrictions on voting as con-
venient alternatives to serious voter-competence inquiries. Though the
states might overhaul the disfranchisement mechanisms to reduce their
over- and underinclusivity, specific competence adjudications would
themselves be problematic. Disfranchisement would still be unnecessary
to further any compelling state interest. Having expanded the franchise
so broadly, the states should discard all devices that single out mentally
disabled citizens for exclusion from political participation.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1976).
112. See H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16 (1965), reprinted in [1965] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2437, 2444-47.
113. If Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to permit universal competence tests
to be administered, officials in some areas might employ the tests as a means of dis-
franchising members of minority groups. Creating such a loophole in the Act could
undermine much of its protection.
114. See R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 366 (understanding requirement "might exclude
a substantial portion of the electorate"); B. SWADRON & D. SULLIVAN, supra note 74, at 81
("[m]any persons who are not considered mentally incompetent" lack capacity for rational
voting).
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